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CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
AND
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ADOPTED BY
THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
FOREWORD
MILTON J. KEEGAN, Chairman,
Colorado Bar Association Special Committee on
Revision of Canons of Ethics

The recent progressive action taken by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in adopting the Canons of Professional Ethics and
Canons of Judicial Ethics, published in this issue, was made at
the recommendation of the Colorado Bar Association and with
the approval of the Colorado District Judges Association. On
close and difficult questions of ethics the members of the Bench and
Bar of Colorado can now rely with confidence upon the annotated
Canons and opinions published by the American Bar Association.
The Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Supreme
Court of Colorado on July 30, 1953, and published in this issue,
are identical with those adopted by the American Bar Association
as amended to date. The Canons originally adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 were soon adopted by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. The American Bar Association, since 1908,
has made nineteen amendments and has adopted fifteen additional
Canons, all of which have now been adopted by our Supreme Court.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the Supreme Court
of Colorado July 30, 1953, and published in this issue, are identical with those adopted by the American Bar Association as
amended to date, except that Canon 30 "Candidacy for Office"
and Canon 31 "Private Law Practice" have been altered slightly
to make them conform with the recent judiciary amendment to
the Colorado Constitution which was sponsored by the Colorado
Bar Association. The late Chief Justice William Howard Taft
was chairman of the committee which prepared the Canons as
originally adopted by the American Bar Association in 1922. Since
then, the Association has made twenty amendments and has added
two Canons, all of which have now been adopted by our Supreme
court with the modifications of Canons 30 and 31.
The American Bar Association, through its Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, has promulgated 286 formal
printed opinions as of January, 1953. So that the profession
might have easy access to them, the annotated Canons and 274
opinions were published in one bound volume by the Association
in 1946. Opinions subsequent to 1946 appear in the American
Bar Association Journal as they are promulgated.
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The Order of the Supreme Court of Colorado promulgated
July 30, 1953, is as follows:
Upon recommendation of the Board of Governors
of the Colorado Bar Association the Canons of Professional Ethics and the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted
by the American Bar Association, as amended, and with
amendments to Judicial Canons 30 and 31 suggested by
the aforesaid Board of Governors are hereby adopted
by the Court.
The Canons, as now adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado, are set forth on the following pages.

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS*
PREAMBLE

In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government rests upon the approval of the people, it is
peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic,
to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure
and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and
the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit
the approval of all just men.
No code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize
all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or
in all the relations of professional life. The following canons of
ethics are adopted by the court as a general guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the
existence of others equally imperative, though not specifically
mentioned.
1.

THE DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE COURTS

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
* These canons, to and including Canon 32 and the recommended oath,
were adopted by the American Bar Association at Its Thirty-First Annual
Meeting at Seattle, Washington, on August 27, 1908. The supplemental canons,
33-45, were adopted at the Fifty-First Annual Meeting at Seattle, Washington.
on July 26, 1928. Canons 11, 13, 34, 35 and 43 were amended, and Canon 46
was adopted, at the 1933 Annual Meeting. Canons 7, 11, 12, 27, 31, 33, 34, 37,
39 and 43 were amended, and Canon 47 was adopted at the 1937 Annual Meeting. Canon 27 was further amended at the Annual Meetings in 1942, 1943 and
1951, and Canon 43' was further amended at the 1942 Annual Meeting.
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criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such
cases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and
the person making them should be protected.
2.

THE SELECTION OF JUDGES

It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selections of
Judges. It should protest earnestly and actively against the appointment or election of those who are unsuitable for the Bench;
and it should strive to have elevated thereto only those willing
to forego other employments, whether of a business, political or
other character, which may embarrass their free and fair consideration of questions before them for.decision. The aspiration of
lawyers for judicial position should be governed by an impartial
estimate of their ability to add honor to the office and not by a
desire for the distinction the position may bring to themselves.
3.

ATTEMPTS TO EXERT PERSONAL INFLUENCE ON THE COURT

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a Judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties,
subject both the Judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the Judge as to the merits of a pending cause,
and he deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt
to gain from a Judge special personal consideration or favor. A
self-respecting independence in the discharge bf professional duty,
without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
Judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal
and official relations between Bench and Bar.
4.

WHEN COUNSEL FOR AN INDIGENT PRISONER

A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought
not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always
exert his best efforts in his behalf.
5.

THE DEFENSE OR PROSECUTION OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIME

It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to
the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only
of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the
land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life
or liberty, but by due process of law.
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution
is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression
of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.
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ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS

It is the duty .of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose
to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties,
and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting" interests, except
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed.
7.

PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICTS OF OPINION

A client's proffer of assistance of additional counsel should
not be regarded as evidence of want of confidence, but the matter
should be left to the determination of the client. A lawyer should
decline association as colleague if it is objectionable to the original
counsel, but if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may
come into the case.
When lawyers jointly associated in a cause cannot agree as
to any matter vital to the interest of the client, the conflict of
opinion should be frankly stated to him for his final determination.
His decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference
makes it impracticable for the lawyer whose judgment has been
overruled to co-operate effectively. In this event it is his duty to
ask the client to relieve him.
Efforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, are unworthy of those
who should be brethren at the Bar; but, nevertheless, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel,
generally after communication with the lawyer of whom the complaint is made.
8.

ADVISING UPON THE MERITS OF A CLIENT'S CAUSE

A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his
client's cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a
candid opinion of the merits and probable result of pending or
contemplated litigation. The miscarriages to which justice is subject by reason of surprises and disappointments in evidence and
witnesses, and through mistakes of juries and errors of Courts,
even though only occasional, admonish lawyers to beware of bold
and confident assurances to clients, especially where the employ-
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ment may depend upon such assurance. Whenever the controversy
will admit of fair judgment, the client should be advised to avoid
or to end the litigation.
9.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPPOSITE PARTY

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend
to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law.
10.

ACQUIRING INTEREST IN LITIGATION

The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject
matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
11.

DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for- promptly, and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
12. FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE
In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their advice and services, as well as those which undervalue
them. A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess
of the value of the service, though his poverty may require a less
charge, or even none at all. The reasonable requests of brother
lawyers, and of their widows and orphans without ample means,
should receive special and kindly consideration.
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the
cause; (2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases
likely to arise out of the transaction, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be employed, or will
involve the loss of other employment while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary
charges of the Bar for similar services; (4) the amount involved
in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the services; (5) the contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6) the character of the employment, whether casual or
for an established and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining
the real value of the service.
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In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar
services, it is proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no lawyer should
permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole
guide in determining the amount of his fee.
In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession
is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere moneygetting trade.
13.

CONTINGENT FEES

A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law,
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
14.

SUING A CLIENT FOR A FEE

Controversies with clients concerning compensation are to be
avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his selfrespect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for
his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only
to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud.
15.

How FAR A LAWYER MAY Go IN SUPPORTING
A CLIENT'S CAUSE

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which
belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false
claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable
transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.
It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal
belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy
or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience
and not that of his client.
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RESTRAINING CLIENTS FROM IMPROPRIETIES

A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent.
his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought
not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
Courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client.
persists in such wrong-doing the lawyer should terminate their
relation.
17.

ILL-FEELING AND PERSONALITIES BETWEEN ADVOCATES

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the
ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other
or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel
should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a cause it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities
and idiosyncrasies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies
between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided.
18.

TREATMENT OF WITNESSES AND LITIGANTS

A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors
with fairness and due consideration, and he should never minister
to the malevolence or prejudices of a client in the trial or conduct
of a cause. The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer's
conscience in professional matters. He has no right to demand
that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive personalities. Improper speech is not excusable on the ground
that it is what the client would say if speaking in his own behalf.
19.

APPEARENCE OF LAWYER AS WITNESS FOR HIS CLIENT

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely
formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
20.

NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION OF PENDING LITIGATION

Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally
they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional
to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should
not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in
the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any
ex parte statement.
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PUNCTUALITY AND EXPEDITION

It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also to
the Courts and to the public to be punctual in attendance, and to
be concise and direct in the trial and disposition of causes.
22.

CANDOR AND FAIRNESS

The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness.
It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote
the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a textbook; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as
authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has
been repealed; or in argument to assert as a fact that which has
not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the
opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon
which his side then intends to rely.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in
drawing affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation
of causes.
A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the Court
should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by argument for its admissibility, nor should he address to the Judge
arguments upon any point not properly calling for determination
by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed
to the court, remarks or statements intended to influence the jury
or bystanders.
These and all kindred practices are unprofessional and unworthy of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer, with the
duty of aiding in the administration of justice.
23.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JURY

All attempts to curry favor with juries by fawning, flattery
or pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are unprofessional. Suggestions of counsel, looking to the comfort or convenience of jurors, and propositions to dispense with argument, should
be made to the Court out of the jury's hearing. A lawyer must
never converse privately with jurors about the case; and both
before and during the trial he should avoid communicating with
them, even as to matters foreign to the cause.
24.

RIGHT OF LAWYER TO CONTROL THE INCIDENTS TO THE TRIAL.

As to incidental matters pending the trial, not affecting the
merits of the cause, or working substantial prejudice to the rights
of the client, such as forcing the opposite lawyer to trial when
he is under affliction or bereavement; forcing the trial on a particular day to the injury of the opposite lawyer when no harm will
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result from a trial at a different time; agreeing to an extension
of time for signing a bill of exceptions, cross interrogatories and
the like, the lawyer must be allowed to judge. In such matters no
client has a right to demand that his counsel shall be illiberal, or
that he do anything therein repugnant to his own sense of honor
and propriety.
25.

TAKING TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE

OF OPPOSITE COUNSEL;

AGREEMENTS WITH HIM

A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the
Bar or of a particular Court, even when the law permits, without
giving timely notice to the opposing counsel. As far as possible,
important agreements, affecting the rights of clients, should be
reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to avoid performance
of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to writing,
as required by rules of Court.
26.

PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY OTHER THAN BEFORE COURTS

A lawyer openly, and in his true character may render professional services before legislative or other bodies, regarding
proposed legislation and in advocacy of claims before departments
of government, upon the same principles of ethics which justify
his appearance before the Courts; but it is unprofessional for a
lawyer so engaged to conceal his attorneyship, or to employ secret
personal solicitations, or to use means other than those addressed
to the reason and understanding, to influence action.
27.

ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT

It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect
advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph
to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions
and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible; but
the customary use of simple professional cards is not improper.
Publication in reputable law lists in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by these canons of brief biographical and informative data is permissible. Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of the profession practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended; with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
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societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
A certificate of compliance with the Rules and Standards issued
by the Standing Committee on Law Lists may be treated as evidence that such list is reputable.
It is not improper for a lawyer who is admitted to practice
as a proctor in admiralty to use that designation on his letterhead
or shingle or for a lawyer who has complied with the statutory
requirements of admission to practice before the patent office to
so use the designation "patent attorney" or "patent lawyer" or
"trade-mark attorney" or "trade-mark lawyer" or any combination of those terms.
28.

STIRRING Up LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring
a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is
not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit
or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds
of action in order to secure them as clients, or .to employ agents
or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or
indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attach6s or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to
seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the
profession devolves upon every member of the Bar having, knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred.

29. UPHOLDING THE HONOR OF THE PROFESSION
Lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the
proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession,
and should accept without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has wronged his client. The counsel upon the
trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to
the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. The lawyer should aid in
guarding the Bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve
not only the law but the administration of justice.
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JUSTIFIABLE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATIONS

The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make
a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or
to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. But
otherwise it is his right, and, having accepted retainer, it becomes
his duty to insist upon the judgment of the Court as to the legal
merits of his client's claim. His appearance in Court should be
deemed equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion
his client's case is one proper for judicial determination.
31.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LITIGATION

No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for
every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right
to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility
must decide what employment he will accept as counsel, what
causes he will bring into Court for plaintiffs, what cases he will
contest in Court for defendants. The responsibility for advising
as to questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits,
for urging questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responbility. He
cannot escape it by urging as an excuse that he is only following
his client's instructions.
32.

THE LAWYER'S DUTY IN ITS LAST ANALYSIS

No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any
cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive
nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving
disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the
judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of
any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust,
or deception or betrayal of the public. When rendering any such
improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern
and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor
of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the clientand his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles
of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client to observe
the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed
and interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously
believes to be its just meaning and extent. But above all a lawyer
will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity
to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a
patriotic and loyal citizen.
33.

PARTNERSHIPS-NAMES

Partnerships among lawyers for the practice of their profession are very common and are not to be condemned. In the formation of partnerships and the use of partnership names care should
be taken not to violate any law, custom, or rule of court locally
applicable. Where partnerships are formed between lawyers who
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are not all admitted to practice in the courts of the state, care
'should be taken to avoid any misleading name or representation
which would create a false impression as to the professional position. or privileges of the member not locally admitted. In the
formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who
is not a member of the legal profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline. In the selection and
use of a firm name, no false, misleading, assumed or trade name
should be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner, when permissible by local custom, is not unethical,
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. When a member of the firm, on becoming
a judge, is precluded from practising law, his name should not
be continued in the firm name.
Partnerships between lawyers and members of other professions or non-professional persons should not be formed or permitted where any part of the partnership's employment consists of
the practice of law.
34.

DIVISION OF FEES

No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.
35.

INTERMEDIARIES

The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled
or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities
and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest
of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client.
Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed
such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization,
such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal
services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is
interested, but this employment should not include the rendering
of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect
to their individual affairs.
36.

RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in
any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in
a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.
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CONFIDENCES OF A CLIENT

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences.
This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well
to his employees; and neither of them should accept employment
which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his
employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources
of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment
when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance
of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from
disclosing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make
such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect
those. against whom it is threatened.
38.

COMPENSATION, COMMISSIONS AND REBATES

A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and
consent of his client after full disclosure.
39. WITNESSES
A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective
witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party. In doing so, however, he should scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated to
induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in
any degree to affect his free and untrammeled conduct when appearing at the trial or on the witness stand.
40.

NEWSPAPERS

A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications
in which he gives information upon the law; but he should not
accept employment from such publications to advise inquirers in
respect to their individual rights.
41.

DISCOVERY OF IMPOSITION AND DECEPTION

When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has
been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a
party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or
his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps.
42.

EXPENSES
A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer
shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith
advance expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement.
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43. APPROVED LAW LISTS
It is improper for a lawyer to permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the profession, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.
44.

WITHDRAWAL

FROM EMPLOYMENT AS ATTORNEY OR COUNSEL
The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment, once assumed, arises only from good cause. Even the desire or consent of the client is not always sufficient. The lawyer
should not throw up the unfinished task to the detriment of his
client except for reasons of honor or self-respect. If the client
insists upon an unjust or immoral course in the conduct of his
case, or if he persists over the attorney's remonstrance in presenting frivolous defenses, or if he deliberately disregards an
agreement or obligation as to fees or expenses, the lawyer may
be warranted in withdrawing on due notice to the client, allowing
him time to employ another lawyer. So also when a lawyer discovers that his client has no case and the client is determined to
continue it; or even if the lawyer finds himself incapable of conducting the case effectively. Sundry other instances may arise
in which withdrawal is to be justified. Upon withdrawing from
a case after a retainer has been paid, the attorney should refund
such part of the retainer as has not been clearly earned.
45.

SPECIALISTS

The canons of the American Bar Association apply to all
branches of the legal profession; specialists in particular branches
are not to be considered as exempt from the application of these
principles.
46.

NOTICE OF SPECIALIZED LEGAL SERVICE

Where a lawyer is engaged in rendering a specialized legal
service directly and only to other lawyers, a brief, dignified notice
of that fact, couched in language indicating that it is addressed
to lawyers, inserted in legal periodicals and like publications, when
it will afford convenient and beneficial information to lawyers
desiring to obtain such service, is not improper.
47.

AIDING THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name,
to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice
of law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.
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I do solemnly swear by the everliving God: that,

E

I

I will support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Colorado;
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice and Judicial officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, nor any
defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;

0,4,
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5
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I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to
mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no

compensation in connection with his business except
S

from him or with his knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and

advance no facts prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged;

.j

I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice.

ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
SEPTEMBER 11, 1922
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CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS*
ANCIENT PRECEDENTS

"And I charged your judges at that time, saying Hear the
causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between
every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him.
"Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear
the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face
of man; for the judgment is God's; and the cause that is too hard
for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it."-Deuteronomy, I,
16-17.
"Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise,
and pervert the words of the righteous."-Deuteronomy, XVI, 19.
"We will not make any justiciaries, constables, sheriffs, or
bailiffs, but from those who understand the law of the realm and
are well disposed to observe it."-Magna Charta, XLV.
"Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere not
jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." ...
"Judges ought to be more learned than witty; more reverend
than plausible; and more advised than confident. Above all things,
integrity is their portion and proper virtue."...
"Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no
grace to a judge first to find that which he might have heard in
due time from the Bar, or to show quickness of conceit in cutting
off evidence or counsel too short; or to prevent information by
questions though pertinent."
"The place of justice is a hallowed place; and therefore not
only the Bench, but the foot pace and precincts and purprise thereof
ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption." . .- Bacon's Essay "of Judicature."
PREAMBLE

In addition to the Canons for Professional Conduct of Lawyers which it has formulated and adopted, the American Bar Association, mindful that the character and conduct of a judge should
never be objects of indifference, and that declared ethical stand* These Canons, to and including Canon 34, were adopted by the American
Bar Association at its Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on July 9, 1924. The Committee of the Association which prepared the
Canons was appointed in 1922, and composed of the following: William H.
Taft, District of Columbia, Chairman; Leslie C. Cornish, Maine; Robert von
Moschzisker, Pennsylvania; Charles A. Boston, New York; and Garret W. McEnerney, California. George Sutherland, of Utah, originally a member of the
Committee, retired and was succeeded by Mr. McEnerney. In 1923, Frank M.
Angellotti, of California, took the place of Mr. McEnerney.
Canons 28 and 30 were amended at the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting, Grand
Rapids, Michigan, August 30-September 1, 1933. Canons 35 and 36 were adopted
at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting, at Kansas City, Missouri, September 30, 1937.
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ards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to set forth
its views respecting those principles which should govern the
personal practice of members of the judiciary in the administration of their office. The Association accordingly adopts the following Canons, the spirit of which it suggests as a proper guide and
reminder for judges, and as indicating what the people have a
right to expect from them.
1.

RELATIONS OF THE JUDICIARY

The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to his personal conduct which concern his
relation to the state and its inhabitants, the litigants before him,
the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court, and
the witnesses, jurors and attendants who aid him in the administration of its functions.
2.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Courts exist to promote justice, and thus to serve the public
interest. Their administration should be speedy and careful.
Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulings and in the
conduct of the business of the court, so far as he can, to make it
useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
3.

CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS

it is the duty of all judges in the United States to support
the federal Constitution and that of the state whose laws they
administer; in so doing, they should fearlessly observe and apply
fundamental limitations and'guarantees.
4.

AVOIDANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety; he should avoid infractions
of law; and his personal behavior, not only upon the Bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day
life, should be beyond reproach.
5.

ESSENTIAL CONDUCT

A judge should be temperate, attentive, patient, impartial,
and, since he is to administer the law and apply it to the facts,
he should be studious of the principles of the law and diligent in
endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
6.

INDUSTRY

A judge should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him.
7.

PROMPTNESS

A judge should be prompt in the performance of his judicial
duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, jurors and attorneys
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is of value and that habitual lack of punctuality on his part justifies dissatisfaction with the administration of the business of the
court.
8.

COURT ORGANIZATION

A judge should organize the court with a view to the prompt
and convenient dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate
abuses and neglect by clerks, and other assistants who are sometimes prone to presume too much upon his good natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association with him.
It is desirable too, where the judicial system permits, that he
should cooperate with other judges of the same court, and in other
courts, as members of a single judicial system, to promote the
more satisfactory administration of justice.
9.

CONSIDERATION FOR JURORS AND OTHERS

A judge should be considerate of jurors, witnesses and others
in attendance upon the court.
10.

COURTESY AND CIVILITY

A judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those
who are young and inexperienced, and also to all others appearing
or concerned in the administration of justice in the court.
He should also require, and, so far as his power extends, enforce on the part of clerks, court officers and counsel civility and
courtesy to the court and to jurors, witnesses, litigants and others
having business in the court.
11.

UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSEL

A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticise and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counsellors, brought
to his attention; and, if adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter at once to the proper investigating
and disciplinary authorities.
12.

APPOINTEES OF THE JUDICIARY AND THEIR COMPENSATION

Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and other
persons appointed by a judge to aid in the administration of justice
should have the strictest probity and impartiality and should be
selected with a view solely to their character and fitness. The
power of making such appointments should not be exercised by
him for personal or partisan advantage. He should not permit
his appointments to be controlled by others than himself. He
should also avoid nepotism and undue favoritism in his appointments.
While not hesitating to fix or approve just amounts, he should
be most scrupulous in granting or approving compensation for
the services or charges of such appointees to avoid excessive allowances, whether or not excepted to or complained of. He cannot
rid himself of this responsibility by the consent of counsel.
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KINSHIP OR INFLUENCE

A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative
is a party; he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly
enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position
or influence of any party or other person.

14. INDEPENDENCE
A judge should not be swayed by partisan demands, public
clamor or considerations of personal popularity or notoriety, nor
be apprehensive of unjust criticism.
15.

INTERFERENCE IN CONDUCT OF TRIAL

A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to
clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue
interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of
the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often
necessary, but the judge should be studious to avoid controversies
which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. in addressing counsel,
litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial manner
or tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments
except to clarify his mind as to their positions, and he should not
be tempted to the unnecessary display of learning or a premature
judgment.
16.

Ex PARTE APPLICATIONS

A judge should discourage ex parte hearings of applications
for injunctions and receiverships where the order may work detriment to absent parties; he should act upon such ex parte applications only where the necessity for quick action is clearly shown;
if this be demonstrated, then he should endeavor to counteract
the effect of the absence of opposing counsel by a scrupulous
cross-examination and investigation as to the facts and the principles of law on which the application is based, granting relief
only when fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. He should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of defendants and should not be
granted lightly or inadvisedly. One applying for such relief must
sustain the burden of showing clearly its necessity and this burden
is increased in the absence of the party whose freedom of action
is sought to be restrained even though only temporarily.
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17. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
A judge should not permit private interviews, arguments or
communications designed to influence his judicial action, where
interests to be affected thereby are not represented before him,
except in cases where provision is made by law for ex parte
application.
While the conditions under which briefs of argument are to
be received are largely matters of local rule or practice, he should
not permit the contents of such brief presented to him to be concealed from opposing counsel. Ordinarily all communications of
counsel to the judge intended or calculated to influence action
should be made known to opposing counsel.
18.

CONTINUANCES

Delay in the administration of justice is a common cause of
complaint; counsel are frequently responsible for this delay. A
judge, without being arbitrary or forcing cases unreasonably or
unjustly to trial when unprepared, to the detriment of parties,
may well endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of
their duties to the public interest, to their own clients, and to the
adverse party and his counsel, so as to enforce due diligence in
the dispatch of business before the court.
19.

JUDICIAL OPINIONS

In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate
the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that he has not
disregarded or overlooked serious arguments of counsel. He thus
shows his full understanding of the case, avoids the suspicion of
arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his intellectual integrity and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the
law.
It is desirable that Courts of Appeals in reversing cases and
granting new trials should so indicate their views on questions
of law argued before them and necessarily arising in the controversy that upon the new trial counsel may be aided to avoid
the repetition of erroneous positions of law and shall not be left
in doubt by the failure of the court to decide such questions.
But the volume of reported decisions is such and is so rapidly
increasing that in writing opinions which are to be published
judges may well take this fact into consideration, and curtail them
accordingly, without substantially departing from the principles
stated above.
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of
last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision.
A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly
his individual reputation than that of the court to which he should
be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on
fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged
in courts of last resort.
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INFLUENCE OF DECISIONS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW

A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of
law and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such
action may become a precedent unsettling accepted principles
and may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to
the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law.
21.

IDIOSYNCRASIES AND INCONSISTENCIES

Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncrasies
of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and
expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be extreme or
peculiar in his judgments, or spectacular or sensational in the
conduct of the court. Though vested with discretion in the imposition of mild or severe sentences he should not compel persons
brought before him to submit to some humiliating act or discipline
of his own devising, without authority of law, because he thinks
it will have a beneficial corrective influence.
In imposing sentence he should endeavor to conform to a
reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity
or publicity either by exceptional severity or undue leniency.
22. REVIEW
In order that a litigant may secure the full benefit of the right
of review accorded to him by law, a trial judge should scrupulously grant to the defeated party opportunity to present the questions arising upon the trial exactly as they arose, were presented,
and decided, by full and fair bill of exceptions or otherwise; any
failure in this regard on the part of the judge is peculiarly worthy
of condemnation because the wrong done may be irremediable.
23. LEGISLATION
A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation
of statutes, especially those relating to practice, and to ascertain
whether they tend to impede the just disposition of controversies;
and he may well contribute to the public interest by advising those
having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the result of
his observation and experience.
24.

INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS

A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will in any way interfere
or appear to interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and
proper administration of his official functions.
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BUSINESS PROMOTIONS AND SOLICITATIONS FOR CHARITY

A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office to
persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the
success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises.
He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or
pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion,
nor use the power of his office or the influence of his name to
promote the business interests of others; he should not solicit for
charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which,
in the normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might
bring his personal interest into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.
26.

PERSONAL INVESTMENTS AND RELATIONS

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in the court;
and, after his accession to the Bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable
that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
He should not utilize information coming to him in a judicial
capacity for purposes of speculation; and it detracts from the
public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of his judicial
judgment for him at any time to become a speculative investor
upon the hazard of a margin.
27.

EXECUTORSHIPS AND TRUSTEESHIPS

28.

PARTISAN POLITICS

While a judge is not disqualified from holding executorships
or trusteeships, he should not accept or continue to hold any
fiduciary or other position if the holding of it would interfere or
seem to interfere with the proper performance of his judicial
duties, or if the business interests of those represented require
investments in enterprises that are apt to come before him judicially, or to be involved in questions of law to be determined by him.
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political
questions, and while not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped
by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active
promoter of the interests of one political party as against another.
He should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting
payment of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in
party conventions.
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He should neither accept.nor retain a place on any party committee nor act as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan
activities. Where, however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated and elected as candidates of a political party, nothing herein
contained shall prevent the judge from attending or speaking at
political gatherings, or from making contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has nominated him and seeks his
election or re-election.
29.

SELF-INTEREST
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part
any judicial act act in which his personal interests are involved.
he has personal litigation in the court of which he is judge,
need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should,
course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.
30.
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CANDIDACY FOR OFFICE

A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer
others to make for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal
to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing power;
he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing
while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will
administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
No judge of the district court or the supreme court shall
accept nomination for any public office other than judicial, the
term of which shall begin more than 30 days before the end of
his term of office, without resigning from his judicial office.* in
order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige
of his judicial position to promote his own candidacy or the success
of his party.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he
should refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using the power or prestige of his
judicial position to promote his candidacy or the success of his
party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his
candidacy which would reasonably lead to such suspicion.

31. PRIVATE LAW PRACTICE
In many states the practice of law by one holding judicial
position is forbidden. In superior courts of general jurisdiction, it
should never be permitted. The Colorado Constitution provides
that no judge of the district court or supreme court shall engage
in the practice of law. In inferior courts in some states, it is per* Amended to conform to 1952 Amendment to Colorado Constitution.
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mitted because the c6unty or municipality is not able to pay adequate living compensation for a competent judge. In such cases
one who practises law is in a position of great delicacy and must
be scrupulously careful to avoid conduct in his practice whereby
he utilizes or seems to utilize his judicial position to further his
professional success.
He should not practice in the court in which he is a judge,
even when presided over by another judge, or appear therein for
himself in any controversy.
If forbidden to practise law, he should refrain from accepting
any professional employment while in office.
He may properly act as arbitrator or lecture upon or instruct
in law, or write upon the subject, and accept compensation therefor, if such course does not interfere with the due performance
of his judicial duties, and is not forbidden by some positive provision of law.
32.

GIFTS AND FAVORS

A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practising before him or from others
whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment.

33. SOCIAL RELATIONS
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty
that a judge should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable
that, so far as reasonable attention to the completion of his work
will permit, he continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that
he should not discontinue his interest in or appearance at meetings of members of the Bar. He should, however, in pending or
prospective litigation before him be particularly careful to avoid
such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that
his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in influencing his judicial conduct.

34. A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL OBLIGATION
In every particular his conduct should be above reproach. He
should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient,
punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamor, regardless of
public praise, and indifferent to private political or partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law, and deal
with his appointments as a public trust; he should not allow other
affairs or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and
proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should he administer
the office for the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or
increasing his popularity.
35.

IMPROPER PUBLICIZING OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity
and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, dur-
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ing sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the
broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to
detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the
witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create
misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and
should not be permitted.
Providing that this restriction shall not apply to the broadcasting or televising, under the supervision of the court, of such
portions of naturalization proceedings (other than the interrogation of applicants) as are designed and carried out exclusively
as a ceremony for the purpose of publicly demonstrating in an
impressive manner the essential dignity and the serious nature
of naturalization.
36.

CONDUCT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

Proceedings in court should be so conducted as to reflect the
importance and seriousness of the inquiry to ascertain the truth.
The oath should be administered to witnesses in a manner
calculated to impress them with the importance and solemnity of
their promise to adhere to the truth. Each witness should be sworn
separately and impressively at the bar or the court, and the clerk
should be required to make a formal record of the administration
of the oath, including the name of the witness.
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FABULARIS QUI ADVOCATO
FLOYD F. MILES
of the Denver Bar

Of the many colorful characters who graced the Colorado Bar
in the first quarter of this century, perhaps none was more fabulous than John A. Deweese. A short, chubby, roly-poly man
with a keen sense of humor, a booming voice, a fanatic devotion to the cause of his clients, and, though perhaps it did not
occur to him, a master psychologist. He came to the Colorado
bar in 1882 and forty years later was still going strong. The
stories told of him are legion, some of them believable, some
wholly incredible. In the early twenties he headed the firm of
Deweese & McPhail in the E. & C. Building. The firm was later
augmented by the appearance of Buford 0. Wheeler and became
Deweese, McPhail & Wheeler. After McPhail's death it was
known as Deweese & Wheeler. Our contemporary, B. 0. Wheeler
is presently the sole remaining evidence of the firm.
Deweese's chief interest and activity was in the field of criminal law where he excelled in cross-examination and an ability to,
try the district attorney and, if need be, the court. It is said that
on one occasion, while defending a client accused of a liquor violation in the old West Side Court, he was twitted by the district
attorney as being against the enforcement of all liquor laws, and
specifically as being an ardent "anti-prohibitionist." This he indignantly denied, retorting that while he would not lay claim to
being a patron or sponsor of the W. C. T. U., he would "much
rather have prohibition than no liquor at all."
Deweese and McPhail, so it is said, were once defending a
client in the criminal court. The case went to the jury about 3
o'clock in the afternoon and as Deweese was obliged to catch a
4 o'clock train for Kansas City on urgent business, and as the
outcome of the trial was doubtful and the client an important one,
he left in structions with McPhail to wire him on the train as
soon as the jury should return a verdict, and hurriedly left for
the station. To the surprise of everyone, the jury returned a
verdict of "not guilty." McPhail was delighted and immediately
telegraphed Deweese, care of the conductor on the train, "Justice
has prevailed." Came back an immediate reply, "Take an appeal."
One of the stories told of him concerns the defense of a poor
downtrodden, debt ridden tenant farmer of Adams County,
charged with burglary, larceny, etc., etc. The complaining witness was a prosperous farmer who owned and operated a large
farm near that occupied by the defendant. The prosecuting witness testified that on a cool, clear night in late summer, he was
aroused from.his slumbers by the barking of dogs and the neighing and snorting of horses. Alarmed at the commotion, he slipped
his feet in carpet slippers, snatched a revolved from under his
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pillow, and in night cap and gown, set out to investigate. Coming
to the granary, hard by the barn, he discovered the defendant
with a team and farm wagon backed up to the open door of the
granary. In the wagon were seven sacks of wheat; on the floor
of the granary, just inside the door, were three sacks of the same
grain. The defendant was standing near the tail gate of the
wagon at the instant the witness came upon him and ordered
him to put up his hands and "march." The sheriff was called and
the defendant taken to Brighton and lodged in jail. Throughout
this ordeal the defendant had spoken no word, other than incoherent mumblings, which neither the witness nor sheriff could
make sense of, his conduct indicating that he was overcome with
fright, remorse or disappointment. The team and wagon were
identified as the property of defendant and the sacks, which were
filled with grain, as the property of the complaining witness.
On cross-examination Deweese reviewed the facts as related
above and then asked the complaining witness:
Q. Now Mr. Spivins you have a foreman or head man
on your farm by the name of Oscar Ogat, have you not? A.
I did have but he ain't with me anymore.
Q. No? Where is he? A. I don't know. He left about
a year ago and I ain't seen him since.
Q. Where does he live? A. I don't know that neither.
Q. Did he quit your employ or did you fire him?
A. Oh, he quit, but where he is now, I don't know. I ain't
seen him since.
Q. Do you know anything about his family, or how
he could be located? A. No, I don't know nothing about
them.
Q. You don't know very much, do you Mr. Spivins?
A. Well maybe I don't, but by George what I do know
I know as good as anybody.
Q. Now during the time Ogat worked for you, he
had full charge of running the farm didn't he? A. He
sure did, he was a good man.
Q. And you trusted him and relied on him completely,
didn't you? A. I sure did.
After his motion for a directed verdict was overruled, the
defendant took the witness stand. The jury was told of his numerous family; his struggle through the years of poverty and perennial hard luck in trying to grub a living from the soil. He testified that everything the complaining witness said was true; that
he was present at the time and place stated; that it was his team
and wagon; that there were seven sacks of wheat in the wagon
and three on the floor of the granary just inside the door, exactly
as the witness had testified.
Q. Now Bill, you just tell the court and jury in your
own words what happened and why you were at Mr.
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Spivin's farm on that night. A. Well sir, it is about two
years ago now, in the early fall it was, I had been having
a pretty tough time and I had no money and I had no
seed and I had no credit and it looked like I wouldn't put
in a crop. Me and Oscar Ogat was pretty good friends,
I had helped him out a time or two when he needed help,
and he had always been friendly to me. I went to Oscar
and told him what I was up against and asked him if he
thought the old man, that is Mr. Spivins, would loan me
enough seed to put in a crop of wheat, and he said well
now Bill you know how the old man is, he wouldn't give
you nothing if he was suffering for it, and it ain't no
use to ask him, but I'll tell what you do. The old man
and the family is going into Brighton tonight to the picture show, so you come over about 9 o'clock and I'll let
you have about ten sacks of seed wheat. You put in your
crop this fall and next summer when you harvest it, you
pick out ten sacks of your best wheat and some night
when the old man is away you bring it back and put it
in the granary and the old man will never know the difference, he won't know a thing about it.
Q. And just what were you doing that night at Mr.
Spivin's farm? A. I thought the old man was away and
I was just bringing back the wheat I had borrowed.
It is said that after two days of futile wrangling the jury
was unable to agree and was discharged. The case was not tried
again.
Author's Note. The facts and circumstances above related,
while not guaranteed, were received from sources believed to be
unreliable. Moreover, the names have been changed to protect
the innocent.

HEIRS FOUND, ESTATE MISSING!
In 1948 a Denver attorney wrote to one John McConville of
Lurgan, County Armagh, Northern Ireland, in an effort to locate
the heirs of another John McConville who died in 1880 possessed
of mining claims at Leadville, Colorado. Heirs of the late Mr.
McConville have now been located but the name of the Denver
lawyer who was seeking them is not known and the estate cannot
be located. Any lawyer having information concerning this matter
is urged to contact Aneurin Rees and Davies, Solicitors, 60 Castle
Street, Liverpool, England.
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A THOUGHT ON SLUM CLEARANCE
TERRY J. O'NEILL*
of the Denver Bar

The slum problem is one of the greatest faced by any municipal government. This is so because the slum appears as an ulcer
to mar the physical beauty of the community and creates an environment which breeds crime and a wide variety of social problems and leaves scars upon our youth which can rarely be eradicted
completely. The cost of these slums to the community is incalculable as it is in this area that most of our welfare services, our
social services and our police services operate. Our very costly
jails and juvenile detention halls are largely populated with the
product of the slum.
The usual method of slum clearance at the present time is
through condemnation which not only is extremely costly but which
often leads to another evil, government owned and operated housing projects. The author submits that any city can permanently
free itself of slums in a period of several decades without cost to
itself, without invoking powers of eminent domain and without
violating any constitutional guarantees of due process.
Although the usual slum is a costly burden to all taxpayers
of a community, it still produces income for its owners. The slum
can be made self-liquidating without any government subsidy by
a plan which will make it economically desirable for the owner
of substandard property to replace his improvements. Before
showing how this might be brought about let me outline the economic conditions responsible for most slums.
The investor who erects a housing unit, a warehouse, hotel
or office calculates an estimated life for the improvement and sets
up a depreciation schedule based upon this estimated life. He may
estimate the life of his duplex at forty years, for example, and
take a depreciattion of 21/2% of the total cost as an ordinary
operating expense each year before computing the profit on his
investment. He certainly will claim such a deduction for federal
tax purposes. If the building is destroyed by fire or other casualty
the remaining cost is usually restored to the investor through insurance proceeds. If the building is not destroyed by some casualty, it is still standing and probably is still producing income at
the end of its estimated life. If the building is not producing
income, the landowner still will not go to the expense of demolishing it unless to make room for another improvement or to avoid
taxes and other liability on account of the structure. A slum has
been created.
Another investor may acquire the structure and he in turn
will again calculate a schedule of depreciation, estimating maybe
* The author writes as an individual and a property owner and not in any
representative capacity.
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a ten year remaining life, and will rent the property to whatever
use will produce the highest income to meet his 10% per year
depreciation schedule. He again claims a tax deduction for this
expense and the building may still be standing when the second
estimated life expires. It still has some value which each subsequent owner will try to bleed from it or which will have to be
paid by any condemning authority attempting to remove the offending structure. The. tax value of the land is reduced. Tax
revenue is lost because each subsequent owner claims larger deductions for depreciation and quite frequently extra burdens are imposed upon city services as pointed out earlier because of the uses
to which the now sub-standard structure is being put.
This is the condition which exists in all of our slums. The
economic flaw is that a building is constructed with but one life
expectancy for the purpose of amortizing its cost and should not
acquire a new life expectancy each time a new owner acquires the
premises. Some income produced by a building after its anticipated
life has expired should be held by any prudent investor as a fund
to replace the structure. Instead, with each sale, the vendor takes
the fruit and relinquishes all responsibility for the tree that produced it and a new owner begins his exploitation of a property
that has already repaid its cost and normal profit.
Analyzing the slum problem economically in this fashion leads
to one obvious solution. The owner of a structure should not be
allowed to entirely sever the fruit from the tree that produces it
and the following method of accomplishing this end is suggested.
Each municipality seriously considering its slum problem and
willing to lay long range plans which can not vacillate with changing administrations can create a municipal housing authority to
fix the estimated remaining life of every building now used for
the production of income or for each building when converted to
such use. Each building owner should be allowed an election between the estimated life fixed by the engineer for the municipal
housing authority or that adopted by himself in computing his
depreciation deduction for federal tax purposes. But, once fixed
the estimated life should not be altered regardless of any sale of
the property except on account of capital improvements which
clearly prolong the life of the building and comply with definitions of capital improvements as set forth in existing Federal
revenue laws.
When any building producing income completes its fixed life
expectancy, a quarterly payment equal to the amount previously
deducted for depreciation should be paid into an escrow fund
either in a local bank approved by the housing authority or to
the housing authority itself. In many cases this will create a
hardship as a building forty years old may not produce income
equal to 2 7%of its original cost each year. Therefore an alternative payment of 10% of the gross income produced by the property might be allowed for the owner claiming hardship.
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Title to the funds thus held in escrow must remain in the
owner of the land and run with the land, being bought by and
passed on to any subsequent* purchaser acquiring the property.
Withdrawals from the fund could only be allowed for justified
capital improvements which will clearly improve or prolong the
life of the structure and which receive the approval of the municipal housing authority. The entire amount in the escrow fund
could not be paid out to the owner until it is showed that the land
has been leveled and returned to a virgin state or that the funds
are to be used to replace the former structure with a new structure in all respects complying with existing city building codes
and zoning ordinances.
The plan should provide an effective penalty to be imposed
upon anyone who receives income from any property without having its remaining life expectancy fixed and recorded with the
housing authority even if this income be merely the rental of a
sleeping room in a private residence. Thus the plan would reach
virtually every property which might be involved in a slum problem for rare indeed would be the house, hotel or the like that will
not at some time be used to produce income.
It is to be noted that the plan also provides relief for the
owner of his own home who wishes to stay in his residence however decrepit it might become. Quarterly payments into the escrow fund are only paid out of income produced by the property
either on the basis of the depreciation schedule previously adopted
by the property owner or on the basis of 10% of the gross income
received from the property itself or a business operated on the
property. This owner would have no payments to make for he
has no income from the property even though the life expectancy
of his home may have been recorded at an earlier date. However,
few indeed are the present slum residents who own their own
homes and these usually maintain their property with some degree of pride. Business properties would always be covered by
the plan.
It is true that some old buildings produce a negligible amount
of income and it would be a long time before the escrow funds
attaching to these properties would be substantial enough to
induce the owner to demolish or replace his improvements in order
to obtain a release of the fund. However the funds would grow,
however slowly, and the time would eventually arrive. Even here
the situation could be no worse than under the present method
where we wait until the owner decides that it is cheaper to level
the building than to continue to pay taxes on it or until some
authority exercises powers of eminent domain.
Giving further thought to the application of such a plan as
this will'reveal that many situations must be provided for if no
hardships are to result, if constitutional guarantees are not to be
abridged and if the plan is to reach all types of offending properties. While I have considered a large number of these problems
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and feel that solutions to all of them can be easily developed, I
have not attempted to confuse this outline with a discussion of
them.
It is my belief that we can plan the economy of our communities to make it more economical for a landowner to build new
buildings than to maintain sub-standard structures. The plan
here suggested is far less drastic than slum clearance through
exercise of the power of eminent domain and will effectively and
permanently meet the problem even though more slowly at firstand it will not put municipal governments in the housing business
under the guise of slum clearance.
Some structures in our slums are fine old buildings of which
we were once proud and which returned nice profits for their
various owners. They are not to blame and some of the income
they produce during their declining years should be used to provide for them a dignified burial.

DICTA NEEDS ARTICLES
Each month the editors of Dicta try to provide readers with
40 pages of material of interest to Colorado lawyers. It is sometimes difficult for the editors to find sufficient material of suitable
quality or type to meet the needs of this publication. We know
that some lawyer each day completes a brief on some phase of
Colorado law which would be of interest to his professional colleagues if re-written in article form and submitted to the editors.
We know that many lawyers have valuable ideas on favorite subjects which other lawyers in the state would find of interest.
Regularly we all uncover curiosities and items of interest which
the Editors of Dicta would consider worthy of publication.
We call the attention of all readers to the statement on the
title page of each issue of Dicta reading "The submission to the
editors of articles of interest to the profession is invited." Articles
or items of interest should be sent to the editor at 702 Midland
Savings Building, Denver 2, Colorado.

PERSONALS
Norris C. Bakke, formerly Justice of the Supreme Court of
Colorado and more recently in charge of the Legal Division of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in Washington, D. C., has
returned to the private practice of law in association with Renah
F. Camalier and H. Stewart McDonald under the firm name of
Camalier, McDonald & Bakke, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.,
Washington 6, D. C.
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MORE ON RES GESTAE
ARTHUR BURKE*
of the Eleventh Judicial District Bar

In the July issue of Dicta 1952 appeared an article entitled
"Res Gestae in Colorado".' In this article res gestae wass classi-2
fied into three 3categories. They were "spontaneous declarations",
"verbal acts", and "contemporaneous acts". It was the latter
category which excited some comment and as a consequence is
worthy of further exploration.
Once again it is not the object of the writer to criticize the
Supreme Court of Colorado, but rather merely to inform the practitioner and student that this classification of res gestae does exist
and to attempt a clarification of the logic involved.
A partial exposition of the proposition that res gestae in Colorado involves a third element, which is a contemporaneous act,
is found in an article by Max Melville 4 in Dicta, July 1952. Mr.
Melville, however, confines the use of contemporaneous acts to sex
cases and in this he is not borne out by the cases.
This category of res gestae is, it is true, seemingly confined
to criminal cases. The logic behind this seems to be more that
these are the only situations in which there would be an objection to this type of evidence, rather than that the court has any
desire to restrict it. The objection made is that these contemporaneous acts are sometimes offenses themselves and knowledge
by the jury of their commission might unduly prejudice them
against the defendant in this trial. In most instances this is true.
Knowledge by the jury of some act, an offense in itself, committed while committing the offense with which the defendant is
charged, would prejudice the jury. Evidence of this act would
best be kept out. Why then, is it allowed? The answer to this
is fairly simple. Because, under certain circumstances, it would
be impossible for a witness to testify in regard to the act with
which the defendant is charged without at least a mention of a
contemporaneous act.
Take as an example the Garcia case.5 The defendant was on
trial for first degree murder. He had committed an assault upon
a person and when an arrest had been attempted had killed the
person arresting him. A witness attempting to relate the events
to the jury would find his story distorted and only a half truth
if not allowed to mention the assault which led to the arrest attempt. It is conceivable, in a similar situation, if this evidence
* Written while a student at University of Denver College of Law.

Dicta, July, 1952, "Res Gestae in Colorado" by Arthur Burke and Arthur
Frazin.
2 Which was admitted to be a part of the res gestae.
'Which, while criticized as such, are generally admitted to be a part of the
res gestae.
4Dicta, supra, p. 249, "Evidence as to Similar Offenses, Acts, or Transactions in Criminal Cases" by Max Melville.
IGarcia v. People, 59 Colo. 434, 149 P. 614 (1915).
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were excluded, for a jury furnished with only an half truth, to conceive of the arresting officer as committing an assault on the
defendant.
It is through practical necessity then that courts in their
search for the truth should admit such evidence.
Res gestae has been defined as "things done; transactions;
essential circumstances surrounding the subject. The circumstances, facts and declarations which grow out of the main fact
are contemporaneous with it and serve to illustrate its character." 6
Contemporaneous acts certainly fit this definition. Take once
again the Garcia case.7 The contemporaneous act of assaulting
the other person certainly grows out of the murder. That is, an
explanation for the officer's attempt to arrest Garcia is contained
in the explanation of the assault. The assault was contemporaneous with the murder. It had immediately preceded it. And it
served to illustrate its character. This is, a jury may have been
led to believe that the killing had an entirely different character
without knowledge of the assault and ensuing arrest attempt. It
is to be seen that a contemporaneous act fits the definition of
res gestae.
There are many who, admitting the necessity of admitting
this evidence and the proposition that spontaneous acts fit the
definition of res gestae, nevertheless maintain that it should be
isolated to save courts the possibility of confusion. They feel
that lumping spontaneous declarations, verbal acts, and contemporaneous acts into one rule of evidence and calling it res gestae
creates confusion. It is not the terming of all three as res gestae
which creates the confusion; it is the failure to distinguish the
logic underlying each."
This restriction of the res gestae rule has found no sympathy
in Colorado courts. As was said in Stahl v. Cooper,9 "The tendency
is to broaden, rather than restrict, the res gestae rule."
Colorado has made broad use of the spontaneous acts in res
gestae to help ascertain the facts of a case. There is only one
requirement, besides those generally accepted in res gestae, and
that is that the contemporaneous act be so interwoven with the
main act as to be a part of it. That is, that it would be impossible
to give a clear, honest opinion of what had happened without at
least allusion to the contemporaneous act.
In 1913 the Colorado Supreme Court defined res gestae in
such a way as to include contemporaneous acts. "Res gestae may
be defined as matter incidental to the main facts and explanatory
thereof, including acts and words so closely connected therewith
as to constitute a part of it; the circumstances, facts, and declarations, which spring out of the main fact, are contemporaneous
with it, and serve to illustrate its character." 10
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 1539.

'Garcia v. People, supra.
S See Dicta, "Res Gestae in Colorado", supra.
Stahl v. Cooper, 117 Colo. 468, 190 P. 2d 891 (1948).
"OMartinez v. People, 55 Colo. 5, 132 P. 64 (1913).
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It is strictly a doctrine of necessity. If there is any way the
evidence desired can come in with this obviously prejudicial evidence being excluded, this will be done. When, however, the ends
of justice cannot be met without it, the evidence will be admitted.
A few cases will better serve to illustrate the character of a
contemporaneous act.
In Piela v. People 11 the defendant who was tried for assault
upon A had at the same time assaulted B. The court held evidence
of the assault on B as a part of the res gestae and admissible. As
can be seen, this evidence meets all the requirements enumerated
in Martinez v. People, supra. It also meets the requirement that
the evidence of the assault upon B, which is not the subject of
the trial, is so interwoven with the assault upon A that a witness could not describe the affray without a mention of it. Such
a result is not only logical but is justifiable. It would be unconscionable to fail in conviction in such a case merely because a
witness mentioned the assault upon B when describing the assault
upon A. This is, of course, the point upon which the entire question turns-is it possible to introduce the evidence of the assault
in question without alluding to the other assault? In this case it
was not and the evidence was properly admitted and labeled
res gestae.
This case is also an example of the court going beyond the
realm of sex cases as mentioned by Mr. Melville in his article supra.
The assault involved was not of a sexual nature.
Garcia v. People, supra, is another example of the court admitting evidence of a contemporaneous act in a case not involving
a sex offense. It too was labeled res gestae. " . . . evidence that
the defendant had committed an assault upon another and killed
the deceased while resisting arrest, was competent as a part of
the res gestae." The court may have erred in commenting upon
the competency because what should be questioned is the materiality or relevancy, but nevertheless, the meaning is clear and the
court had once again declared a contemporaneous act as a part of
the res gestae.
It seems in some cases that the evidence admitted as res
gestae might more properly be admitted as showing a scheme or
design. Such a case is Granato v. People 12 in which there was an
admission of evidence that defendant, who was prosecuted for
statutory rape, aided his companion, who allegedly raped another
girl, in removing her from the automobile. This case more properly seems to show design or scheme, but there is a thread running
through this case and all contemporaneous acts cases which is not
necessarily present in those in which a scheme or design is proved.
That thread is the element of the necessity of admitting this evidence to allow the proper evidence for a conviction of a guilty party.
Another case of this type is the case of Pearson v. People 13
Piela v. People, 6 Colo. 343 (1882).
'Granato v. People, 97 Colo. 303, 49 2d 431 (1935).
" Pearson v. People, 69 Colo. 76, 168 P. 655 (1917).
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in which it was held that the court properly admitted as part of
the res gestae, evidence of circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest, taking of arms from him, etc. It is not contended
here that the Colorado court has never been wrong in admitting
evidence as a contemporaneous act and part of the res gestae. If
the court has erred this would seem to be the case. This depends
on the circumstances of the case and, as in this case, it might
appear that perhaps the court erred in holding this to be a part
of the res gestae. If, however, it appears that the arrest and the
offense are closely connected, in point of time under the circumstances, then the arrest might actually be contemporaneous with
the act for which the defendant is indicted.
The thread running through all contemporaneous acts cases
is the thread of necessity. The necessity for admitting evidence
of another act or occurrence in order to receive evidence of the
4
main act. This is borne out quite clearly in Sarno v. People.1
In
this case evidence was admitted of different acts of the same kind
constituting several offenses and it was held that no error was
committed where it appeared that the acts were all a part of a
single transaction.
There is no reason for excluding evidence of this sort. But
there is one fact which must be kept in mind, which is that the
rule of necessity should govern such admissions. If the evidence
desired can be admitted without admitting statements concerning
contemporaneous acts this should be done. Where it is impossible
to separate the different acts then the evidence must come in.
An adequate safeguard against the prejudicial effects of the
admission can be obtained in the court's instructions to the jury
wherein he may warn them of the singleness of purpose of the
admission of this evidence.
Res gestae then, as seen in Colorado, is composed of three
categories. Undoubtedly spontaneous declarations and verbal acts
are still the most important of these three, but contemporaneous
acts should be recognized and accorded its place as a part of the
Colorado law on evidence. Such recognition, along with an understanding of the principles involved, will aid the attorney in the
preparation of his case and the court in its determination of these
questions of evidence.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
County Judge George A. Wollbrinck of Lamar offers for sale
the furnishings of his law office and sets of American Jurisprudence, Nichol's Forms and the Colorado Statutes Annotated.
A complete set of the U. S. Reports may be purchased from
Petre and Zimmerman of Glenwood Springs, Colorado.
The 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated and many volumes of
the Restatements are offered for sale by Julius F. Seeman, 415
Symes Building in Denver.
4

Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924).
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INSTITUTES
One of the primary functions of any bar association is to
provide for the continuing education of its lawyer members. This
purpose is accomplished by the programs arranged by the Institute Committees of the Colorado Bar Association and of each local
bar association. In Denver there is also the Topical Luncheon
Committee of the Denver Bar Association which arranges discussion luncheons at which a limited number of attorneys are invited
to participate in a study of some very narrow field of law such
as the proper use of a particular legal form or the legal aspects
of some specific type of commercial transaction. The chairmen of
the Institute Committee and the Topical Luncheon Committee of
the Denver Bar Association request that readers of Dicta communicate to the Secretary of the Bar Association their desires as
to subjects for Institutes or Topical Luncheons. Such requests
are highly valued by your bar association as we are always anxious
to provide programs which are of interest to, or needed by the
largest number of our members.
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COUNTIES
' \\ \N

couk-ry

D~Jr

NOW you can take advantage of complete abstracting and recording service for Adams and
Arapahoe counties, as well as for Denver, right
here IN DENVER. Fast.. .accurate...convenient!
May we serve you?
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